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CBHI has achieved low population coverage in West Africa and elsewhere. Studies seeking to explain 
this point to inequitable enrolment, adverse selection, lack of trust in scheme management and 
information and low quality of health care. Interventions to address these problems have been 
proposed yet enrolment rates remain low.  This exploratory study proposes that an under-
researched determinant of CBHI enrolment is social capital. Fieldwork comprising a household 
survey and qualitative interviews was conducted in Senegal in 2009. Levels of bonding and bridging 
social capital among 720 members and non-members of CBHI across three case study schemes are 
compared. The results of the logistic regression suggest that, controlling for age and gender, in all 
three case studies members were significantly more likely than non-members to be enrolled in 
another community association, to have borrowed money from sources other than friends and 
relatives and to report having control over all community decisions affecting daily life. In two case 
studies, having privileged social relationships was also positively correlated with enrolment. After 
controlling for additional socioeconomic and health variables, the results for borrowing money 
remained significant. Additionally, in two case studies, reporting having control over community 
decisions and believing that the community would cooperate in an emergency were significantly 
positively correlated with enrolment. The results suggest that CBHI members had greater bridging 
social capital which provided them with solidarity, risk pooling, financial protection and financial 
credit. Qualitative interviews with 109 individuals selected from the household survey confirm this 
interpretation. The results ostensibly suggest that CBHI schemes should build on bridging social 
capital to increase coverage, for example by enrolling households through community associations. 
However, this may be unadvisable from an equity perspective. It is concluded that since enrolment 
in CBHI was less common not only among the poor, but also among those with less social capital and 
less power, strategies should focus on removing social as well as financial barriers to obtaining 
financial protection from the cost of ill health. 
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Community-based health insurance (CBHI) is typically not-for-profit and aims to provide financial 
protection from the cost of seeking health care through voluntary prepayment to community owned 
and controlled schemes (Hsiao, 2001). Senegal has witnessed a rapid increase in the number of CBHI 
schemes, reaching 129 in 2007 (CAFSP, 2010). The government elected in 2012 views CBHI as a 
mechanism for achieving universal coverage (Ministère de la Santé, 2012), a continuation of the 
previous government’s policy (Ministère de la Santé, 2004). However, as in most low- and middle-
income countries (LMIC), overall coverage in Senegal remains low, with 4% or less of the population 
enrolled in CBHI (Soors, Devadasan, Durairaj, & Criel, 2010), echoing wider limitations of CBHI 
(Ekman, 2004).  
 
There have been numerous studies on the determinants of enrolment in CBHI in sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) (Defourny & Faillon, 2011). Demand-side determinants identified by quantitative studies from 
West Africa are: higher levels of wealth and education, poorer health status and being prone to the 
risk of illness (Chankova, Sulzbach, & Diop, 2008; De Allegri, Kouyate, Becher, Gbangou, Pokhrel, 
Sanon et al., 2006a; Jütting, 2003, 2004). Determinants on the supply-side include a perception of 
the inadequacy of traditional care and long distance from the health facility (De Allegri et al., 2006a). 
Qualitative studies suggest that perceptions of quality of health care, trust in CBHI scheme 
management (Criel & Waelkens, 2003), availability of information on CBHI (Ridde, Haddad, 
Yacoubou, & Yacoubou, 2010) and scheme design (De Allegri, Sanon, Bridges, & Sauerborn, 2006b) 
also determine enrolment. A third set of determinants points to social and cultural issues, including 
low levels of socioeconomic inequality within the community , membership of other community 
organisations (Jütting, 2003) and ethnicity and religion (De Allegri et al., 2006a; Jütting, 2003).  
 
The literature proposes the following strategies to address inequity, adverse selection and 
inadequate supply of health services and insurance: public funding to subsidise premiums, strategies 
to promote increased revenue collection from the “healthy and wealthy”, and improved CBHI 
management and quality of care  (Mills, Ataguba, Akazili, Borghi, Garshong, Makawia et al., 2012; 
Ndiaye, Soors, & Criel, 2007; Soors et al., 2010). Yet continued low rates of enrolment suggest these 
strategies have not been successfully implemented. Meanwhile to date there has been no attempt 
to systematically explain how and why social and cultural determinants affect CBHI enrolment and 
understand the policy implications. This gap is addressed by the present study which proposes that 
the decision to enrol in CBHI is determined, in part, by levels of social capital. The hypothesis to be 
tested is that people who decide to enrol in CBHI have bonding and bridging social capital, while 
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those who do not enrol have less bridging social capital or bonding social capital only. This is 
explored by comparing levels of social capital among members and non-members of three CBHI 
schemes in Senegal.   
Background: defining social capital  
The study builds on the argument that social capital can promote or constrain CBHI, proposed in a 
literature review of CBHI by Mladovsky and Mossialos (2008). They adopt the following definition of 
social capital: “the information, trust and norms of reciprocity inhering in one’s social network” 
(Woolcock, 1998):153). Tracing interconnected theories of social capital they further adopt the 
principle that social capital constitutes:  “those expectations for action within a collectivity that 
affect the economic goals and goal-seeking behavior of its members, even if these expectations are 
not oriented toward the economic sphere” (Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993):1323).  
Bonding versus bridging social capital 
Drawing on Portes & Sensenbrenner (1993), Mladovsky and Mossialos (2008) argue that 
distinguishing between “bonding” and “bridging” social capital is essential to understanding whether 
features of social capital (e.g. expectations between individuals, the trustworthiness of structures, 
information channels, norms and effective sanctions) have a productive outcome in CBHI. “Bonding 
social capital” inheres in dense networks within communities.  Research suggests that while bonding 
social capital makes the accumulation of human and economic capital possible in some contexts, it 
can be unproductive in others. For example in some immigrant groups in the USA high levels of 
bonding social capital lowered transaction costs in enterprise (Portes, 1998; Portes & 
Sensenbrenner, 1993). However, bonding social capital was unproductive in other groups, 
promoting free-riding on communal resources, derision of efforts to work hard and cutting off 
important external sources of information  (Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993); this is hereafter termed 
the “negative effect of bonding social capital”. The differing impact of bonding social capital on 
economic action is explained by varying levels of “bridging social capital”, which inheres in micro 
level extra-community networks. Productive immigrant groups were characterized by individuals 
who were able to draw on bridging relations outside the network as well as bonding relations. This is 
thought to be because extra-community relations were free from the potentially overwhelming 
demands family and friends place on successful members of the group for support, permitting 
exchange to take place on the basis of formal rules or fair market competition (Portes & 
Sensenbrenner, 1993). Studies of bonding and bridging social capital from the development 
literature on SSA (Campbell, 2003; Njuki, Mapila, Zingore, & Delve, 2008; Titeca & Vervisch, 2008) 
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broadly support the findings from North America. However, mixed methods studies differentiating 
between the impact of bonding and bridging social capital in SSA are rare, and none have focused on 
CBHI.  
The unequal distribution of social capital 
Another characteristic of social capital which may hinder positive developmental outcomes is 
identified by Bourdieu (1986) who argues that individuals who already hold forms of capital 
(economic, social, cultural and/or symbolic) are strategically more adept at accumulating and 
transforming it (he argued that these types of capital are fungible). Through the continual process of 
accumulating and transforming the different forms of capital, unequal power relations and social 
hierarchies are formed and strengthened. The aforementioned literature on social capital in Africa 
also broadly supports this theory. As such it is important to study the distribution of social capital 
within communities and consider how this might cause unequal access to benefits offered by 
development projects. Previous studies of CBHI do not take such issues into account.   
 
Methods 
The study used a mixed methods multiple case study design which included a household survey and 
semi-structured interviews. Ethical approval for the research was obtained from the Senegalese 
Ministry of Health. 
Case study selection 
The fieldwork was conducted in March – August 2009. To enhance generalizability of the results of 
the study (Yin, 1994), multiple (three) cases constituting CBHI schemes were selected: Soppante, 
Ndondol and Wer Ak Werle (WAW) (Table 1). Three regions (out of 12) were first selected for 
inclusion in the study. These were among the regions with the highest number of CBHI schemes in 
Senegal (Table 1), meaning the study focuses on contexts where CBHI development is relatively 
advanced. In each region, the federation which coordinates CBHI schemes provided information 
used to identify the three cases. The cases all fulfilled two basic criteria of success in order to control 
for the possibility that a lack of enrolment was mainly due to supply-side problems: the number of 
members1 ever enrolled in the CBHI scheme (including those whose policy had expired) was greater 
                                                          
1
 A “member” (termed “adherent” in French) is permitted to register 10-12 people from their household on 
the insurance policy meaning that the total number of enrollees in the insurance schemes was far higher than 




than the national average of 329 (Hygea, 2004); and the schemes had been established for a 
minimum of eight years. At the same time, the schemes varied according to the following criteria, in 
order to study a wide range of contexts (Table 1): geographic zone; type of economic sector of the 
target population; and tier of services contracted by the scheme. 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
Quantitative methods 
Sampling  
Since overall population enrolment rates were low, disproportionate stratified sampling was used. In 
each case study, a list of households which had ever purchased a CBHI policy was used as a sampling 
frame for the random selection of members (Table 2). All three schemes had a high rate of non-
renewal of policies (Table 2). This is typical for CBHI schemes in Senegal (Hygea, 2004) and SSA more 
generally (De Allegri, Sauerborn, Kouyate, & Flessa, 2009). Because this study is concerned with the 
decision to ever enrol in CBHI, and since expired policies (i.e. the most recent monthly premium had 
not been paid) could be renewed by paying the outstanding premium payments and a penalty 
charge, both households with active and expired policies are referred to as “members” and are 
included in the analysis. Each group was sampled separately (Table 2). The household questionnaire 
was administered to the named member.  The control sample was selected using the “random 
route” method to select non-member households living in close proximity to the members 
interviewed2. In the control households, the household head and/or spouse were asked who in the 
household would in theory be responsible for CBHI membership and this person was interviewed.   
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
Questionnaire design 
A questionnaire was developed with six core components: socioeconomic and demographic 
characteristics; household roster; economic characteristics; social capital; membership of CBHI; and 
health and utilisation of health services. For the social capital component, most questions were 
adapted from the SOCAT questionnaire (World Bank).  
Variables  
The dependent variable is membership of CBHI. Among the independent variables, eight measure 
different facets of social capital. These were the main variables on which information related to 
                                                          
2
 This is similar to the methodology used in a UNDP study of at risk populations (UNDP, 2006) 
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social capital was collected. Individual/household rather than community level variables were used. 
Two social capital variables measure the structure of social networks: number of memberships of 
associations and privileged relations. The remaining variables measure tangible and perceived assets 
that may be transmitted by social networks:  information; belief that everybody in the community 
would cooperate (a proxy for solidarity); trust; financial credit; perceptions of control over local 
decision-making (a proxy for social power); and voting (a proxy for political participation).  
Membership of associations was used as a proxy for bridging social capital, since it implied having 
social links beyond kin, friendship, or intra-community groups. Furthermore, associations typically 
had a productive function, even if this was not their primary goal (Niang, 2000). Examples of 
associations included Muslim prayer groups (“dahiras”), rotating credit and savings associations 
(ROSCAs) (“tontines”), microcredit groups, sports clubs and CBHI itself. The variable is based on the 
question “How many associations do you and members of your household belong to in total (not 
including the CBHI scheme)?”. In the case of Soppante, a dummy variable was created to categorise 
households according to whether they belonged to no associations or to one or more associations. 
For Ndondol and WAW, the questionnaire asked for the specific number of associations to which a 
household belonged and dummies measure membership of no, one, two, three, or more than three 
associations. This was because in these case studies, another association had partnered with CBHI, 
meaning that some CBHI members were de facto members of two associations. It was hypothesised 
that, as in previous studies (Jütting, 2003), enrolment in CBHI would be positively correlated with 
membership of other associations, since people with existing social capital are likely to be more 
adept at further accumulating it.  
In order to measure bonding social capital a dummy variable based on the question “Do you have 
privileged relationships?” was used. In Senegal “privileged relationships” are a form of “fictive 
kinship”(Carsten, 2000). Common examples are “ndeye dike” (“the mother of my choosing or twin”), 
“homonyme” (a namesake - a child that is named after a person) or “parrain / marrain” (“godfather / 
godmother”). These relationships constitute emotional and affective ties but can also be a medium 
for instrumental financial support (Buggenhagen, 2011).  It was hypothesised that enrolment in CBHI 
may be either negatively or positively correlated with having privileged social relations, depending 
on levels of bridging social capital.    
The issue of information channels was explored by a question asking where respondents obtained 
information on community matters or politics, with a set of 14 possible responses (multiple 
responses were permitted). A dummy variable distinguishes between receiving information from 
relatives, friends and neighbours only (a proxy for bonding social capital only), or receiving 
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information from relatives, friends and neighbours and / or another source (e.g. the local market, 
traditional forums, or associations) (a proxy for bonding plus bridging, or only bridging, social 
capital). Assuming the information on CBHI was positive (i.e. it promoted enrolment), it was 
hypothesised that people who received information from relatives, friends and neighbours only 
were less likely to enrol in CBHI due to the “negative” effect of bonding social capital.  
A set of variables was included on perceptions of solidarity within the community and was derived 
from the question “Do you think it is likely that everybody in the community would cooperate to 
solve a common problem such as a lack of water?”. It was hypothesised that enrolment would be 
positively correlated with high levels of solidarity if, as per the discourse around CBHI in Senegal 
(Ministère de la Santé, 2004), solidarity was seen as characteristic of CBHI.  
Another variable measures generalised trust. Bonding social capital was measured by trusting in 
one’s friends, family and most people in one’s community, while bridging social capital was 
measured by trusting: people from other ethnic or linguistic groups; foreigners; people of other 
religions / brotherhoods / confessions; local government; imams and priests; traditional leaders; 
teachers; medical staff; security forces; justice; and persons of other castes. Responses were given 
on a Likert scale. Indices were constructed by performing a principal component analysis. It was 
hypothesised that a lack of trust at any level could prevent enrolment due to fears of moral hazard 
and / or corruption in CBHI (Pauly, Zweifel, Scheffler, Preker, & Bassett, 2006). This hypothesis is 
supported by a study which found that higher degrees of generalised trust were correlated with 
Chinese farmers’ willingness to join community financing (Zhang, Wang, Wang, & Hsiao, 2006). 
A further set of variables focused on sources of financial credit, following Bourdieu’s theory that the 
various forms of capital are fungible. A set of dummies was created from the following questions: 
“Did you borrow money in the last 12 months?” and “From whom did you borrow the money?”. The 
latter question was followed by a set of eight options (multiple responses were permitted). The 
dummies divide respondents into three groups: those who had not borrowed money; those who had 
borrowed money from family, relatives or friends only (a proxy for bonding social capital); and those 
who had borrowed money from family, relatives, friends and / or another source, such as an 
association (a proxy for having bonding plus bridging, or only bridging, social capital). It was 
hypothesised that people who had not borrowed money or borrowed money from immediate 
family, relatives or friends only were less likely to enrol in CBHI due to the “negative” effects of 
bonding social capital. This is supported by a study on voluntary health insurance in Vietnam (Jowett, 
2003) which showed that borrowing money from informal financial networks (family and friends) 
was correlated with lower rates of enrolment. 
9 
 
Another variable focused on control over local decision-making, following Bourdieu’s theory that 
social capital increases social power. One set of dummies was based on the question “How many of 
the decisions made in the community or by neighbours which affect your daily life do you have 
control over?”. Five possible responses were offered, ranging from “control over no decisions” to 
“control over all decisions”.  
Finally,  a dummy variable was based on a question asking respondents whether they voted in the 
most recent local elections. This was used as a proxy for bridging social capital since voting in Africa 
has been found to be positively associated with increased membership of civil society groups and 
political mobilization (Kuenzi & Lambright, 2005). It was hypothesised that voting would be 
positively correlated with CBHI enrolment. 
The main potential confounders that are commonly included in quantitative studies on CBHI 
enrolment and on social capital and health (Harpham, Grant, & Thomas, 2002) are included in this 
study. In addition to age and gender of the respondent, the socio-economic characteristics 
considered were level of education, household expenditure and wealth. The expenditure variable is 
based on reported monthly household expenditure on 14 different categories. Expenditure was 
adjusted using the OECD scale (weighting 1 for the first adult, 0.7 for other adults and 0.5 for each 
child) (Forster, 1994; OECD). To proxy household wealth, an asset index was constructed by 
performing a principal component analysis using variables of household possession of goods (Howe, 
Hargreaves, Gabrysch, & Huttly, 2009). The health variables used are: disability, chronic illness, 
recent illness or accident in last 15 days and self-assessed health. For the latter variable three 
dummies were created, the first combining “very good” and “good”, and the third combining “poor” 
and “very poor”.  Given that Senegal is ethnically and religiously diverse (Smith, 2013), ethnicity 
(whether or not the respondent is Wolof (the majority ethnicity)) and religion, (whether or not the 
respondent is Muslim (the predominant religion)) were included.  In the third case study, WAW, the 
religion variable was dropped since almost 100% of respondents reported being Muslim.  
Model 
A logit model was used to analyse the probability of enrolling in CBHI; the dependent variable was 
equal to 1 if the household was enrolled in CBHI and 0 if not. Each of the eight social capital variables 
were analysed separately. Two regressions were run for each social capital variable. The first 
regression was a restricted model which includes only age and sex as control variables (Model 1, 
Table 4). The second regression was an unrestricted model where an additional range of 
socioeconomic and cultural control variables was included (Model 2, Table 5). Since, according to 
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Bourdieu, the different forms of capital are fungible, one might expect any correlation between 
social capital and CBHI enrolment observed in Model 1 to disappear in Model 2.  
We estimated a model of the form: 
Logit [𝑝 (y = 1)] = log  (
𝑝
1−𝑝
) = α + β 1X1,i + …+ β12X12,i 
where Y is being a member of CBHI or not,  X1-12 are dummies indicating whether the individual has 
or does not have a specific characteristic, p is the probability of enrolment in CBHI, α is the constant 
and βs are the model parameters. For each regression, c statistics were used to measure the 
goodness of fit of the model. The likelihood-ratio test was used to compare the fit of Model 1 and 
Model 2. All models are case study specific and were estimated using STATA 10.0. 
Qualitative methods 
A total of 109 individuals from member and non-member households of the three CBHI schemes 
(Table 3) were purposively selected to include a variety of characteristics (age, gender, position in 
the household) from the household survey and interviewed again by the same interviewer, using 
semi-structured topic guides. The guides covered: decision-making on CBHI enrolment, comparison 
of CBHI to other associations, impact of CBHI on social capital, perceptions about management of 
the scheme and health care utilisation. Sample size was determined by the data obtained and data 
collection continued until saturation. All interviews were recorded and transcribed using verbatim 
transcription. All transcripts were analysed in Nvivo8 by a team of coders using deductive coding 
with an a priori coding frame (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The interview guides, background literature 
and hypotheses were used to develop the coding frame. All members of the coding team were 
trained to ensure a common understanding of the codes. The coding frame was piloted and revised 
with extra codes before application to the full dataset. Throughout the coding process, the coders 
periodically cross-checked each other’s coding to maintain consistency. Results of the qualitative 
analysis were used for triangulation and to expand the interpretation of the quantitative results 
(Collins, Onwuegbuzie, & Sutton, 2006). As such, codes pertaining to the variables included in the 
quantitative analysis were selected for further analysis in this paper. The broader results of the 





The sample consists of 720 individuals across the three case studies. Descriptive statistics are 
presented in the supplementary material.  
INSERT LINK TO SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL HERE 
In terms of bridging social capital, across the three case studies over 85 per cent of households 
contained at least one individual who was a member of at least one association other than CBHI (see 
supplementary material). Households enrolled in CBHI were significantly more likely to be members 
of other associations compared to non-CBHI households, controlling for age and gender only (Model 
1, Table 4). In Ndondol and WAW, CBHI households were more likely to be members of several other 
associations, suggesting these were not only associations that were de facto linked to CBHI. The 
results are strongest and most consistent in WAW where membership of other associations rather 
than the socio-economic variables was statistically significant (Model 2, Table 5).  
INSERT TABLES 4 AND 5 HERE 
Views on what CBHI and other associations have in common may help understand these results. In 
all three case studies members said that both types of organisation aim to improve community 
development through solidarity and democracy: 
“what I see as similarities is primarily... social mobilization with the same objectives… solidarity 
among members… in addition to democracy…. All (CBHI) members are treated in the same way, they 
are on an equal footing... In the other associations... there is also democracy”. (WAW member 
household) 
In terms of bonding social capital, across the three case studies, over 80 per cent of respondents had 
privileged relationships. In Soppante and Ndondol, members were three or more times as likely to 
have privileged relationships as compared to non-members in Model 1 and for Ndondol the 
relationship remained significant in Model 2. The qualitative results suggest that kinship and 
privileged relations were a medium for instrumental financial support, both in general and 
specifically in the context of CBHI, as illustrated by the practice of members enrolling their extended 
kin: 
“We have a second CBHI policy which is held by my younger brother and on that policy we enrolled 
my other brothers, their children and my homonyms (namesakes)” (Soppante member household) 
Similarly, several non-members said they had not enrolled in CBHI because they could not afford to 
pay the premium for their extended kin.   
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A minority of respondents (around 8 to 12 per cent) reported receiving information on community 
matters or politics from relatives, friends and neighbours only. Members were less likely to report 
this than the non-members, although this was (weakly) statistically significant only in one case study. 
The qualitative interviews help to explain why diversified access to information was a determinant of 
enrolment, as all types of interviewees complained that information about the CBHI schemes was 
scarce.  
In Soppante and WAW, members were more than two times as likely to perceive their community to 
have solidarity (measured by the belief that everyone would cooperate to solve a common problem) 
than non-members and this was statistically significant in Model 2. Solidarity in CBHI was seen by 
members to derive from contributing to CBHI even when healthy, thereby allowing risk pooling to 
take place: 
“If you enrol and pay premiums (into the CBHI scheme), you benefit, but you also help others.” 
(Soppante member household) 
Between 50 and 60 per cent of respondents had borrowed money in the last 12 months. CBHI 
members were at least twice as likely to have borrowed money from a source other than, or in 
addition to, family, relatives, or friends, as compared to non-members. This result was strongly 
significant in Model 2 for all three cases. The qualitative interviews reveal that associations were an 
important source of financial credit. 
The results of the principle component analysis of the trust variables were in general not statistically 
significant. Similarly, in the qualitative research, a lack of trust in CBHI managers was not cited as a 
reason for non-enrolment.  
Around a fifth of all respondents reported having control over no decisions made in the community 
or by their neighbours which affected their daily life. CBHI members were more than two times as 
likely to report having control over such decisions compared to non-members. The correlation was 
statistically significant for all three cases in Model 1 and remained significant for Ndondol and WAW 
in Model 2. The types of people who were thought to have influence over community decisions were 
those with cultural, human and social capital: 
“Traditional leaders, retired teachers and leaders of women’s associations are among the people 
who influence important decisions in our community” (WAW, member household) 
More than 60 per cent of respondents reported voting in the last local elections. There was a weakly 
statistically significant difference between members (more likely to vote) and non-members in 
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Ndondol in Model 1. As mentioned, the qualitative results suggest that members believed CBHI 
schemes were managed in a democratic manner, perhaps helping to explain why voting was 
correlated with enrolment.  
 
The other independent variables generally support the findings of previous studies on CBHI. In all 
three cases, members were likely to be better educated, but the results were not statistically 
significant. In Soppante and WAW, CBHI households had significantly higher levels of expenditure 
than non-member households. In Ndondol, CBHI member households were wealthier.  In Soppante, 
members reported worse health for every indicator, possibly indicating adverse selection, although 
this was not statistically significant. In terms of the other independent variables, in some cases there 
were significant differences in age (Soppante) and gender and religion (Ndondol) across members 
and non-members. The differences in gender, religion and ethnicity can mostly be explained by 
specific characteristics of the three schemes (Table 1).     
The likelihood-ratio tests (Table 5) suggest that Model 2 had a better fit than Model 1 in Soppante 
and Ndondol. However, this was not the case for WAW.  For Soppante and Ndondol, the c-statistics 
were all between 0.6 and 0.7 in Model 1 and between 0.75 and 0.8 in Model 2. For WAW, the c 
statistics were between 0.55 and 0.7 in Model 1 and between 0.65 and 0.8 in Model 2.  This suggests 
all the regressions (except for four in Model 1 in WAW) pass the goodness of fit test (Hosmer & 
Lemeshow, 2000).   
 
Discussion 
The social capital variables provide an insight into previously unexplored determinants of CBHI 
enrolment by explicitly distinguishing between bonding and bridging social capital and exploring 
social power differentials. The result that ceteris paribus members of CBHI were more likely to also 
be members of other associations supports the hypothesis that members of CBHI have higher 
bridging social capital. This echoes previous studies on CBHI (Jütting, 2003) and the wider 
development literature which finds that an existing social network is a precondition of participation 
in community organizations (Weinberger & Jutting, 2001). The c-statistics and likelihood-ratio test 
results, which suggest that Model 1 is the stronger model in the case of WAW, underline the primacy 
of bridging social capital as a determinant of urban CBHI. The data suggest that in rural contexts 
(Soppante and Ndondol) members of CBHI are also more likely than non-members to have bonding 
social capital, as measured by having privileged social relationships.  
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The “negative” effect of having only bonding social capital is indicated by the consistent finding that 
members were more likely than non-members to have borrowed money from sources other than 
friends and relatives.  Caution is needed in interpreting these results for Ndondol and WAW, since 
these schemes were connected to a microcredit mechanism. However, the result is strongest for 
Soppante which was not connected to any source of financial credit. The result is also supported by 
the aforementioned Vietnamese study (Jowett, 2003). The negative effect of having only bonding 
social capital is also indicated by the result that members were more likely to receive information 
from sources other than friends, relatives and neighbours (though statistically significant only for 
Soppante in Model 1).  
Taken with the strong finding that CBHI members had higher levels of perceived community-wide 
solidarity and the results on voting and perceived democratic nature of CBHI, it seems that CBHI 
members had greater bridging social capital which they had developed by broadening their social 
networks via democratic social structures which provided them with information, solidarity, risk 
pooling, financial protection and financial credit. Non-members, on the other hand, seem to be 
characterised by bonding social capital only, receiving financial credit and information from a narrow 
social network characterised by affective relationships. Enrolment in CBHI could therefore be 
interpreted as indicative of a transition from what has been described by Durkheim (1984) as 
“mechanical solidarity” (characteristic of traditional societies and typically organized around kinship 
affiliations) to “organic solidarity” (characteristic of complex industrialised societies and based on 
integration of specialized economic and political organizations). The result that the associational 
dynamic and role of generalised trust were the strongest and the effect of privileged relationships 
weakest in the urban context of WAW supports this interpretation.  
The finding that bridging social capital is positively correlated with enrolment in CBHI, while bonding 
social capital alone is not, ostensibly suggests that CBHI schemes should build on existing bridging 
social capital to increase population coverage, for example by enrolling households through 
associations. However, given Bourdieu’s theory that interlinked forms of capital are a source of 
social power, it is likely that the current exclusion of less powerful individuals from CBHI (indicated 
by the result that CBHI members are more likely to have influence over community decisions) would 
be exacerbated by such enrolment strategies. A complementary, or alternative, strategy could be 
subsidies for CBHI premiums which target not only poorer households but also those with low 
bridging social capital and low social power. However, research from West Africa (Porter & Lyon, 
2006) finds that channelling external development funds through groups and associations (such as 
CBHI) often fails to include the poorest and most vulnerable and incurs social costs such as peer 
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pressure and loss of trust, suggesting that overturning established social hierarchies through CBHI 
subsidies could be difficult to achieve in practice. Therefore, echoing previous analyses of market-
oriented health sector reforms (Bennett S, McPake B, & A., 1997) and consumer-led  financing 
(Ensor, 2004), it is likely that alternative or complementary public sector and/or supply-side 
financing policies are needed. These may include direct and indirect tax-based funding (Mills et al., 
2012) and broader social protection policies integrated into government systems of social welfare 
(Devereux & White, 2010).   
 
Limitations  
The study has several limitations. Firstly, as an exploratory study, the sample size is small. Secondly, 
the “random route” methodology may mean that differences between members and non-members 
are either over- or under-estimated. Thirdly, because different forms of capital may be fungible 
(Bourdieu, 1986), it is possible that some of the variables included in the study measure factors 
other than social capital. It is also possible that the social capital variables are picking up the effect of 
other omitted variables. Another limitation is that due to the cross-sectional and non-experimental 
study design, it is difficult to attribute the direction of causality. However, it is likely that the social 
capital variables are a determinant of membership and not vice versa, since social structures such as 
associations and privileged relations are antecedent to CBHI schemes which were established 
relatively recently (Niang, 2000). Furthermore, the policy implications do not depend on the 
direction of the relationship between social capital and CBHI enrolment. Finally, more case studies 
would be needed to increase generalizability.  
 
Conclusions 
Several indicators relating to social capital seem to be strongly, consistently and positively associated 
with CBHI enrolment. The quantitative results are strengthened by the qualitative interviews. These 
results have policy relevance, given that CBHI is at the heart of Senegal’s strategy for universal 
coverage. One implication is that CBHI should build on bridging social capital, for example by 
increasing enrolment through existing associations. However, this strategy may be unadvisable from 
an equity perspective. A second implication is that subsidies for premiums should target not only 
indigent households but also those with low bridging social capital and low social power, in order to 
overcome social barriers to enrolment. However, such reforms are likely to require overturning 
established social hierarchies and may be difficult to implement through CBHI. Alternative or 
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complementary public sector financing policies are needed. The study also demonstrates that 
despite controversy about the concept (Fine, 2001), by drawing on Bourdieu, social capital can be 
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of non-members  
Soppante 985 (166 + 819) 161 (70 + 91) 100 
Ndondol 463 (136 + 327) 156 (58 + 98) 120 

















Soppante 27 10 
Ndondol 18 13 




Table 4. Determinants of enrolment in CBHI (logistic regression results), Model 1 
Independent variables Odds ratios 
  S N W S N W S N W S N W 
Age years (base: <36)   
 
    
 
    
 
    
 
  
36 - 45 0.48* 1.04 0.92 0.42* 0.96 0.77 0.45* 1.09 1.03 0.46* 1.06 0.92 
46 - 55 0.42* 1.34 1.11 0.41* 1.18 1.2 0.40** 1.37 1.07 0.39** 1.39 1.1 
56 - 65 0.20*** 0.9 0.85 0.17*** 0.82 0.52 0.19*** 0.99 0.8 0.16*** 1.03 0.84 
>65 0.22*** 1.37 0.69 0.20*** 1.54 0.74 0.21*** 1.43 1.08 0.19*** 1.4 0.85 
Gender (base: female) 
   
  
 
    
 
    
 
  
Male 1.47 0.50** 1.14 1.58 0.40*** 1.04 1.36 0.43*** 1.12 1.45 0.43*** 1.04 
Member of associations other than CBHI (base: 
none)   
 
    
 
    
 
    
 
  
1 or more 3.66** 
 
    
 
    
 
    
 
  
1   1.22 2.84**   
 
    
 
    
 
  
2   1.15 6.89***   
 
    
 
    
 
  
3   3.36* 3.79**   
 
    
 
    
 
  
>3    1.46 6.13***   
 
    
 
    
 
  
Privileged relationships (base: none)   
 
    
 
    
 
    
 
  
Privileged relationships   
 
  3.22* 4.16** 1.17   
 
    
 
  
Sources of information (base: from   
 
    
 
    
 
    
 
  
friends/relatives/neighbours and/or other sources)   
 
    
 
    
 
    
 
  
From friends/relatives/neighbours only   
 
    
 
  0.35* 0.92 0.83   
 
  
Likelihood of community cooperation (base:    
 
    
 
    
 
    
 
  
not at all likely or very unlikely)   
 
    
 
    
 
    
 
  
Likely         
 
    
 
  3.17* 1.42 1.65 
Highly likely                   2.64* 1.87 1.85 




Table 4. (cont) 
Independent variables Odds ratios 
  S N W S N W S N W S N W 
Age years (base: <36)   
 
    
 





36 - 45 0.40** 1.14 0.98 0.47* 1.19 1.08 0.44* 0.98 1.12 0.38** 1 1 
46 - 55 0.37** 1.44 1.02 0.44* 1.54 1.08 0.37** 1.23 1.14 0.33** 1.26 1.13 
56 - 65 0.17*** 0.98 0.72 0.19*** 1.07 0.65 0.16*** 0.91 0.87 0.13*** 0.86 0.78 
>65 0.22*** 1.73 0.75 0.21*** 1.61 0.71 0.17*** 1.43 1.01 0.18*** 1.21 0.86 
Gender (base: female)   
 
    
 





Male 1.57 0.36*** 1.24 1.35 0.42*** 1.11 1.38 0.40*** 0.99 1.54 0.41*** 1.15 
Borrowed money in last 12 months (base: 
none)   
 
    
 





From friends/relatives only 1.53 1.3 2.33*   
 





From friends/relatives and/or other sources 3.90*** 3.66*** 2.41***   
 





Trust   
 
    
 





Principle component 1   
 





Principle component 2   
 





Principle component 3   
 





Control over community decisions affecting 
daily life (base: none)   
 
    
 





Very few decisions   
 
    
 
  1.68 2.17* 1.46 
  
  
Some decisions   
 
    
 
  1.44 3.01** 2.39** 
  
  
Most decisions   
 
    
 
  1.59 2.29** 2.62** 
  
  
All decisions   
 
    
 
  2.44* 3.71** 3.29** 
  
  
Voted in last local elections (base: no)   
 
    
 





Voted                     0.76 1.71* 1.34 
c-statistic 0.69 0.70 0.63 0.66 0.63 0.60 0.67 0.65 0.62 0.66 0.65 0.56 
24 
 
Notes: *P<0.10; **P<0.05; ***P<0.01. 
Dependent variable: individual enrolment in CBHI (yes = 1; no = 0). 




Table 5. Determinants of enrolment in CBHI (logistic regression results), Model 2 
Independent variables Odds ratios 
  S N W S N W S N W S N W 
Age years (base: <36) 
  
    
 
    
 
    
 
  
36 - 45 0.53 1.59 0.85 0.42 1.55 0.64 0.46 1.81 0.99 0.58 1.76 0.9 
46 - 55 0.21*** 1.6 1.24 0.19*** 1.53 1.28 0.19*** 1.95 1.17 0.18*** 1.93 1.17 
56 - 65 0.17*** 0.84 1.02 0.14*** 0.96 0.55 0.14*** 1.05 0.99 0.15*** 1.12 1.02 
>65 0.21** 1.96 0.59 0.15*** 2.53 0.55 0.18*** 2.53 1.03 0.19** 2.36 0.68 
Gender (base: female) 
  
    
 
    
 
    
 
  
Male 1.43 0.26*** 1.33 1.71 0.23*** 1.22 1.47 0.25*** 1.26 1.39 0.24*** 1.23 
Education (base: none)  
  
    
 
    
 
    
 
  
Literate 1.53 0.68 0.55 1.24 0.74 0.54 1.26 0.81 0.6 1.34 0.81 0.58 
Primary 0.47 0.84 0.91 0.41 0.9 0.74 0.42* 1.13 0.95 0.47 1.13 0.86 
Secondary or higher 1.09 2.26 1.29 0.47 4.11 1.31 1.02 6.07 1.15 1.25 5.27 1.09 
Expenditure quintile (base: lowest) 
  
    
 
    
 
    
 
  
q2 1.9 1.83 1.14 1.69 1.36 0.88 1.9 1.58 1.03 2.06 1.62 1.17 
q3 1.77 0.36* 1.04 2.01 0.31** 0.88 1.6 0.33** 1.15 1.5 0.34** 1.17 
q4 3.86** 0.88 0.98 3.77** 0.7 1.41 4.06** 0.78 1.19 3.73** 0.75 1.28 
q5 (highest) 4.17** 0.83 1.91 5.32** 0.9 1.87 4.08** 0.87 2.61** 4.04** 0.86 2.75** 
Asset quintile (base: lowest) 
  
    
 
    
 
    
 
  
q2 2.43 0.73 0.91 2.47 0.77 0.85 2.24 0.93 1.02 1.92 0.9 0.99 
q3 3.56*** 3.68*** 0.40* 5.22*** 3.54*** 0.41* 3.28** 3.91*** 0.49* 3.87*** 3.47*** 0.45* 
q4 1.88 1.27 1.09 2.49* 1.7 1.57 1.95 1.27 1.15 2.2 1.17 1.21 
q5 (highest) 2.61* 3.42** 0.57 3.34** 2.74** 1.36 2.62* 3.37** 0.93 3.30** 2.91** 0.92 
Ill health 
  
    
 
    
 
    
 
  
Handicapped (base: no) 1.64 2.2 0.39 1.81 2.33 0.45 2.13 2.62 0.71 2.14 2.41 0.64 
Chronic illness (base: no) 0.55 0.72 0.59 0.54 0.73 0.73 0.64 0.73 0.71 0.72 0.77 0.63 
Recent illness (base: no) 1.68 1.3 2.6 2.75* 1.05 2.57 1.77 1.33 2.01 1.71 1.23 2.24 
SAH (base: very good or good) 
  
    
 
    
 





Fair 0.67 0.9 1.07 0.54 0.7 1.09 0.6 0.78 0.97 0.64 0.84 1.07 
Bad or very bad 2.08 2.64 1.3 1.27 2.52 0.98 1.89 2.63 1.02 2.15 2.78 1.5 
Ethnicity and religion 
  
    
 
    
 
    
 
  
Muslim (base: yes) 0.34 0.11***   0.32 0.15***   0.29 0.15***   0.35 0.14***   
Wolof (base: yes) 0.72 1.01 1.31 0.63 1.06 1.6 0.84 0.96 1.46 0.6 1 1.47 
Member of associations other than 
CBHI (base: none) 
  
    
 
    
 
    
 
  
1 or more 3.04 
 
    
 
    
 





0.78 3.33**   
 
    
 





0.87 9.05***   
 
    
 





2.78 3.56**   
 
    
 





1.07 6.37***   
 
    
 
    
 
  
Privileged relationships (base: none) 
  
    
 
    
 





  1.41 5.68** 0.96   
 
    
 
  
Sources of information (base: from 
  
    
 
    
 






    
 
    
 
    
 
  
From friends/relatives/neighbours only 
  
    
 
  0.51 1.7 0.8   
 
  
Likelihood of community cooperation 
(base: not at all likely or very unlikely) 
  
    
 
    
 





    
 
    
 
  1.49 1.57 2.23* 
Highly likely                   3.66* 1.81 2.09* 
Likelihood-ratio test statistic 33.3 40.66 16.61 35.37 32.35 19.85 34.54 40.7 16.17 33.6 25.94 25.14 
P value 0.02 0.00 0.48 0.01 0.02 0.28 0.01 0.00 0.51 0.01 0.26 0.28 








Table 5. (cont) 
Independent variables Odds ratios 
  S N W S N W S N W S N W 
Age years (base: <36)   
 
    
 





36 - 45 0.36* 1.65 0.95 0.52 1.92 1.12 0.43 1.82 1.13 0.42 1.76 0.97 
46 - 55 0.16*** 1.72 1.09 0.19*** 2.22 1.22 0.14*** 1.69 1.15 0.16*** 1.95 1.23 
56 - 65 0.11*** 0.99 0.79 0.14*** 1.26 0.86 0.12*** 0.95 1.02 0.10*** 1.09 0.92 
>65 0.17** 2.53 0.63 0.18** 2.69 0.72 0.12*** 2.29 0.81 0.18** 2.32 0.74 
Gender (base: female)   
 
    
 





Male 1.89 0.22*** 1.43 1.41 0.24*** 1.49 1.74 0.23*** 1.1 1.54 0.21*** 1.35 
Education (base: none)    
 
    
 





Literate 1.18 0.71 0.53 1.35 1 0.42 1.13 0.7 0.56 1.22 0.86 0.6 
Primary 0.34* 0.96 0.86 0.44 1.13 0.95 0.42 1.03 0.83 0.43 1.14 0.92 
Secondary or higher 0.82 4.11 1.14 1.34 6.49 1.07 0.88 7.82* 0.82 0.73 5.66 1.1 
Expenditure quintile (base: lowest)   
 
    
 





q2 1.47 1.46 1.06 2 1.61 0.85 2.2 1.3 0.89 1.6 1.43 0.98 
q3 1.66 0.29** 1.08 1.7 0.32** 1.14 1.63 0.28** 1.24 1.51 0.31** 1.13 
q4 4.00** 0.64 1.1 4.48*** 0.81 1.18 4.22** 0.71 0.97 4.48** 0.74 1.15 
q5 (highest) 3.67** 0.67 2.05 5.64*** 0.89 2.26 4.18** 0.79 2.40* 3.46** 0.81 2.34* 
Asset quintile (base: lowest)   
 
    
 





q2 1.64 0.85 0.89 2.07 1.18 0.82 2.64 0.86 0.82 2.11 1.12 0.91 
q3 2.95** 2.91** 0.49 2.98** 3.81*** 0.49 3.75*** 3.90*** 0.40** 3.61*** 3.76*** 0.46* 
q4 1.75 0.95 1.18 2.01 1.21 1.33 1.94 1.58 1.14 2.25 1.11 1.07 
q5 (highest) 2.81* 2.83** 0.95 2.08 2.93** 0.95 2.69* 3.99*** 0.91 3.01** 3.12** 0.92 
Ill health   
 
    
 







Independent variables Odds ratios 
  S N W S N W S N W S N W 
Handicapped (base: no) 2.2 2.59 0.88 1.77 2.4 0.68 2.35 4.44 0.71 2.21 2.32 0.7 
Chronic illness (base: no) 0.51 0.83 0.73 0.78 0.81 0.64 0.73 0.67 0.65 0.68 0.79 0.67 
Recent illness (base: no) 1.95 0.99 1.8 2.3 1.18 2.13 1.71 1.44 1.62 1.98 1.25 2.06 
SAH (base: very good or good)   
 
    
 





Fair 0.53 0.8 0.98 0.46 0.81 0.83 0.52 0.77 0.97 0.53 0.83 0.99 
Bad or very bad 2.31 2.34 1.26 1.35 2.66 1.01 1.75 4.11 1.15 1.68 1.75 1.2 
Ethnicity and religion   
 
    
 





Muslim (base: yes) 0.26 0.19***   0.3 0.17***   0.25 0.13***   0.28 0.15*** 
 Wolof (base: yes) 0.86 1.24 1.57 0.78 0.94 1.56 0.63 1.16 1.4 0.78 1 1.48 
Borrowed money in last 12 months 
(base: none)   
 
    
 





From friends/relatives only 1.17 1.5 2.02   
 





From friends/relatives and/or other 
sources 4.27*** 2.82** 2.33***   
 





Trust   
 
    
 





Principle component 1   
 





Principle component 2   
 





Principle component 3   
 





Control over community decisions 
affecting daily life (base: none)   
 
    
 





Very few decisions   
 
    
 
  0.78 3.55** 1.27 
  
  
Some decisions   
 
    
 
  0.67 5.24*** 2.22* 
  
  
Most decisions   
 
    
 
  1.03 2.21 3.27** 
  
  
All decisions   
 
    
 
  2.02 3.26* 3.82** 
  
  
Voted in last local elections (base: no)   
 
    
 





Voted                     1.17 1.51 1.32 
Likelihood-ratio test statistic 34.69 33.39 14.01 33.87 37 16.77 35.39 41.19 15.14 32.69 38.09 16.05 
P value 0.01 0.02 0.67 0.01 0.01 0.47 0.01 0.00 0.59 0.02 0.00 0.52 
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Independent variables Odds ratios 
  S N W S N W S N W S N W 
c-statistic 0.78 0.77 0.69 0.77 0.76 0.69 0.78 0.78 0.69 0.76 0.77 0.67 
Notes: *P<0.10; **P<0.05; ***P<0.01. 
Dependent variable: individual enrolment in CBHI (yes = 1; no = 0). 
S = Soppante, N = Ndondol, W = WAW 
 
 
